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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 April 1951

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION NO. 64

FOR: National Estimates Board

SUBJECT: Indications of an Early Satellite Attack on Yugoslavia

REFERENCE: Memorandum to the Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee, from Major General A. R. Bolling, A. C. of S., G-2, dated 25 April 1951 entitled "Likelihood of Satellite Attack on Yugoslavia in Spring, 1951"

1. Reference memorandum notes that:

a. Jet aircraft have recently been observed in all of the European Satellites except Albania;

b. Heavy Soviet ground force equipment is arriving in Bulgaria, Rumania, and particularly in Hungary;

c. Certain Bulgarian military units have recently been redeployed in the direction of the Yugoslav border, and at present there are at least one Bulgarian tank division and four infantry divisions disposed along the Yugoslav border;

d. Although there have been no recent changes in Rumanian and Hungarian military dispositions, the Satellites have the capability of initiating an attack against Yugoslavia at any time with little or no warning;

e. Border incidents between the Satellites and Yugoslavia have increased to the point where Tito has called them "almost unbearable";

f. Soviet-Satellite propaganda attacks on Yugoslavia have been intensified; and

g. Yugoslav-Satellite relations are continuing to deteriorate.

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2. Reference memorandum concludes that a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia "is not probable this spring, but nevertheless remains a distinct possibility."

3. In addition to the points noted in reference memorandum, certain other recent developments in the southern Satellites deserve mention:

a. There is continuing evidence that the Bulgarian and Hungarian armies are being further expanded;

b. High Yugoslav officials are expressing growing concern over an early Satellite attack, and within Yugoslavia a number of defensive precautions have been taken against such a possibility;

c. Early-warning or ground-controlled intercept radar has recently been observed in the vicinity of both Sofia and Budapest;

d. The number of heavy Soviet AA guns in both Bulgaria and Hungary appears to be increasing;

e. Air raid shelters, public warning systems, and blackout regulations are being established in all of the southern Satellites;

f. Airfields in Hungary are being enlarged and improved;

g. The apparent food shortages and the rationing of an increasing number of food products in the southern Satellites strongly suggests that stockpiling is under way.

4. In evaluating these developments it should be observed that they do not all point exclusively toward aggression against Yugoslavia. The recent movement of ground forces in Bulgaria, the border incidents, the propaganda campaign, and the deterioration of Satellite-Yugoslav relations generally point to Yugoslavia as a possible target. But other developments, such as the arrival of jet aircraft, airfield construction, and possible stockpiling are common to all of the Satellites, and to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria as well.

5. In NIE 29, (Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951), it was concluded, inter alia, that "the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia

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in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility". The more recent developments noted in the preceding paragraphs indicate that, since the publication of NIE 29, Satellite capabilities for an attack on Yugoslavia have been somewhat improved, and that preparations for a possible attack are continuing. These recent developments thus give renewed emphasis to the conclusion that such an attack in 1951 "should be considered a serious possibility". They do not, however, appear to warrant the conclusion that such an attack is probable, nor do they necessarily indicate that such an attack will be more likely this spring than later in the year.

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